On July 28, 2023, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (“FERC”) unanimously approved Order No. 2023, a Final Rule designed to streamline the process by which generation resources can connect to the interstate transmission grid.
At a high level, the Final Rule substantially revises the current pro forma large generator interconnection procedures (“LGIP”) and agreement (“LGIA”) with the following updates:
Replacing the current first-come, first-served process with a first-ready, first-served interconnection cluster study process.
Increasing the speed of interconnection queue processing by, among other things, imposing strict study deadlines and penalties on transmission providers.
Incorporating technological advancements into the interconnection process.
Order No. 2023 also makes changes to the small generator interconnection procedures (“SGIP”) and agreement (“SGIA”).
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The international dialogue about climate change and the “net zero” world now includes a focus on hydrogen as an abundant source of energy useful in myriad ways (refining, fertilizer production, motive power, etc.) with potentially zero climate-harmful emissions. For those of us who took Chemistry 101 in high school, we know that hydrogen is by far the most abundant element in the Universe, representing an estimated 70 to 75 percent of all known matter. While that is an awesome number (giving rise to the common student question “How do we know that?”), the fact is that, here on Earth, hydrogen does not exist as a “free” gas—it is present here only in combination with other elements, notably oxygen, carbon, and nitrogen. Thus, to capture hydrogen for use in multiple applications, it must be separated from the paired substances (most commonly water (H2O) and natural gas (CH4)).
In the discourse around capturing hydrogen as a free gas, a color-coding terminology has emerged that rivals a paint store. I call it the “hydrogen color wheel” and it is the source of much confusion. While each of the color “codes” involves a somewhat detailed explanation, my goal in this post is to keep the detail short and within understandable limits.
The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (“FERC” or “Commission”) recently issued a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (“NOPR”) to address industry concerns that FERC’s current Uniform System of Accounts (“USofA”) does not adequately account for renewable energy assets. The NOPR, which was released during the last Commission open meeting, proposes the following four categories of amendments to the USofA, as well as conforming revisions to FERC’s accounting reports:
Creating new production accounts specifically dedicated for wind, solar, and other non-hydro renewable assets;
Creating a single dedicated functional class for energy storage accounts;
Specifying the accounting treatment of renewable energy credits (“RECs”) and similar instruments by codifying prior Commission guidance; and
Adding new dedicated accounts for hardware, software, and communication equipment within existing functions in the USofA.
Additionally, the NOPR requests feedback on whether the FERC Chief Accountant should issue accounting guidance related to hydrogen.
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After seven years, three presidential administrations, and two appearances before the Supreme Court, the Obama Administration’s “Clean Power Plan” (“CPP”)—a Clean Air Act regulation designed to limit carbon emissions from existing coal-fired power plants (and later revised by the Trump-era “Affordable Clean Energy” (“ACE”) rule)—was struck down by the Supreme Court on June 30, 2022. SeeWest Virginia et al. v. Environmental Protection Agency et al., No. 20-1530.
Relying on Section 111(d) of the Clean Air Act (“CAA”), the Environmental Protection Agency’s (“EPA’s”) CPP set a carbon emission limit that was essentially unattainable for existing coal-fired power plants. Consequently, EPA determined that the “best system of emission reduction” for carbon from these plants was to cause a “generation shift” from higher carbon emitting coal-fired sources to lower-emitting sources, such as natural gas plants or wind or solar energy facilities. Compliance with the CPP would have required a plant operator to: (1) reduce the amount of electricity the plant generated to reduce the plant’s carbon emissions; (2) build a new natural gas plant, wind farm, or solar installation, or invest in someone else’s existing facility and increase generation there; or (3) purchase emission allowances as part of a cap-and-trade regime. SeeWest Virginia at 8.
On July 2, 2021, the Department of Energy’s Office of Fossil Energy (“DOE/FE”) issued a Notice of Intent (“Notice”) to Prepare a Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement (“SEIS”) for the Alaska LNG Project (“Project”). DOE/FE will evaluate potential environmental impacts of upstream natural gas production on the North Slope of Alaska, and will conduct a life cycle analysis to calculate greenhouse gas (“GHG”) emissions for liquefied natural gas (“LNG”) exported from the Project.
The $38.7 billion Project includes a proposed gas treatment plant on the North Slope of Alaska, 800-mile pipeline, and a liquefaction facility with a planned liquefaction capacity of 20 million metric tons per year. The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (“FERC”) has issued an order approving the construction and operation of the Project. On August 20, 2020, DOE/FE authorized Alaska LNG Project LLC’s (“Alaska LNG”) request to export LNG to any country with which the United States has not entered into a free trade agreement (“FTA”) requiring national treatment for trade in natural gas (“Non-FTA countries”) in a volume equal to the Project’s planned liquefaction capacity (equivalent to roughly 929 Bcf per year or 2.55 Bcf per day).
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On February 19, 2021, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit (“D.C. Circuit”) upheld a decision by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (“FERC” or the “Commission”) cutting transmission incentives previously granted to three electric transmission companies.
The Energy Policy Act of 2005 amended the Federal Power Act to require FERC to promulgate a rule creating incentive-based rate treatment for electric transmission. The rule was intended to “promote reliable and economically efficient transmission and generation of electricity by promoting capital investment in the enlargement, improvement, maintenance, and operation of all [transmission] facilities, . . . provide a return on equity that attracts new investment in transmission facilities, . . . [and] encourage deployment of transmission technologies and other measures to increase the capacity and efficiency of existing transmission facilities and improve the operation of the facilities . . . .” FERC promulgated such a rule, which is codified in the Commission’s regulations. One incentive available to a stand-alone transmission company (a “Transco”) is “[a] return on equity [“ROE”] that both encourages Transco formation and is sufficient to attract investment.”
Because FERC has traditionally viewed independence as a hallmark of a Transco, it considers the ownership and business structure of the Transco to ensure that the Transco operates independently of other market participants when deciding whether to grant such incentives. FERC has declined to establish a particular methodology for reflecting the degree of a Transco’s independence or specific incentive levels. However, the Commission has made clear that it “will consider the level of independence of a Transco as part of our analysis when we determine the proper ROE for the Transco, and evaluate the specific attributes of a particular proposal, including the level of independence, to determine appropriate incentives.”Continue reading “D.C. Circuit Upholds Cutting of Transmission Incentives by FERC”
The energy industry has been at the forefront of the 2020 election, and energy development is an issue that polarizes Americans and our businesses and political leaders in choosing the path for the future. Energy developments are inextricably linked to our economy and national security, and the decisions and policies that will be implemented over the next four years are critical to the nation and our participation and role in world affairs.
On September 10, 2020, the Commodity Futures Trading Commission’s (“CFTC” or “the Commission”) Division of Enforcement (“the Division”) issued guidance for CFTC staff on the factors to be considered when evaluating compliance programs in connection with enforcement matters. The guidance will be inserted in the CFTC Enforcement Manual. Although not binding on the Commission or any other Division of the CFTC, the Compliance Guidance is binding on Enforcement staff.
In recent years, the Division has taken several steps to increase transparency regarding the performance of its enforcement functions. First, the Division published its Enforcement Manual, which is updated periodically and publicly available on the CFTC’s website. On May 20, 2020, the Division issued guidance to staff regarding factors to be considered in recommending a civil monetary penalty in an enforcement action. Those factors include the existence and effectiveness of an existing compliance program, as well as efforts to improve that compliance program following detection of a violation. The recently issued Compliance Guidance provides factors to be used in evaluating such compliance programs.
The Compliance Guidance focuses on whether the compliance program was reasonably designed and implemented to achieve prevention, detection, and remediation of the misconduct at issue. The Compliance Guidance acknowledges that this assessment depends upon the specific facts and circumstances involved and further states that “[a]t all points, the Division will conduct a risk-based analysis, taking into consideration a variety of factors such as the specific entity involved, the entity’s role in the market, and the potential market or customer impact of the underlying misconduct.”
The Compliance Guidance provides a number of factors for staff to consider in determining whether a compliance program was reasonably designed and implemented to achieve the three goals identified above.
On September 3, 2020, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (“FERC” or the “Commission”) issued an Order on Remand from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, providing a more robust explanation regarding how the NEXUS Gas Transmission, LLC (“NEXUS”) pipeline project, which relied in part on precedent agreements that would export natural gas to Canada, merits authorization under section 7(c) of the Natural Gas Act (“NGA”), thus giving NEXUS eminent domain authority.
On August 25, 2017, the Commission had issued a certificate of public convenience and necessity under section 7(c) to NEXUS. The Certificate Order approved the Project, which allowed for the use of eminent domain to build an approximately 250-mile-long pipeline in Ohio and Michigan. NEXUS had executed eight precedent agreements, accounting for 59 percent of the capacity of the Project, and the Commission found that these agreements demonstrated a need for the Project. Two of the eight precedent agreements were with Canadian companies.
Protesters argued that NEXUS should not be permitted to use eminent domain because some of the project’s capacity would be used to export gas and exports are subject to NGA section 3 authorization, rather than section 7, which does not allow for eminent domain. The Commission affirmed its underlying decision on rehearing and stated that Commission policy did not require FERC to look beyond precedent or service agreements to make judgments about the needs of individual shippers.
Protesters appealed to the D.C. Circuit. In September 2019, the D.C. Circuit, in City of Oberlin v. FERC, 937 F.3d 599, remanded the case to FERC and directed the Commission to supply an explanation for why it allowed the crediting of export precedent agreements with foreign shippers when analyzing market need for a domestic pipeline project. The D.C. Circuit also asked FERC for more robust explanation for why eminent domain was needed or appropriate.
On July 16, 2020, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (“FERC” or “Commission”) issued Order No. 872 (“Order”), a final rule that significantly revised its rules implementing the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978 (“PURPA”). Congress enacted PURPA to reduce the country’s reliance on oil and natural gas by promoting “Qualifying Facilities” (“QFs”) that rely on alternative energy sources or more efficient generation. Since their promulgation, FERC’s regulations implementing PURPA have been largely unaltered. FERC opined that the energy industry has substantially evolved since PURPA was promulgated and that the final rule is necessary to address the changing landscape and more closely align with underlying congressional intent.
Among other things, PURPA requires electric utilities to offer to purchase electric energy from QFs, which are categorized as either small power producers or cogenerators. The rate that a QF may receive for energy must be a rate “not to exceed the incremental cost to the electric utility of alternative electric energy,” which is “the cost to the electric utility of the electric energy which, but for the purchase from such cogenerator or small power producer, such utility would generate or purchase from another source.” In other words, “the purchasing utility cannot be required to pay more for power purchased from a QF than it would otherwise pay to generate the power itself or to purchase power from a third party.” This is referred to as the utility’s “avoided cost.”
Rates for energy are generally categorized as either fixed or “as-available.” Fixed rates are generally fixed at the time of the contract or other legally enforceable obligation (“LEO”) between the QF and the utility and do not vary over the term of the contract or LEO. For example, many renewable energy projects, which generally produce only to sell into the market and rely on a fixed revenue stream for financing, often rely on fixed energy rates. Conversely, other types of generators, such as cogeneration facilities, might only sell into the market when they have excess energy and will take the prevailing price at the time of sale. This rate is referred to as an “as-available” energy rate and is variable. Rates for capacity are generally fixed at the time of contract or LEO. QF rates for energy and capacity are set by state commissions.
Order No. 872 follows a technical conference, notice of proposed rulemaking (“NOPR”), and multiple rounds of industry comments. The Order adopts most of the NOPR proposals and substantially alters the rules for QFs.