Category: Litigation / Enforcement / Court Cases

Bestfoods Revisited

Margaret Anne Hill, Frank L. Tamulonis III, and Stephen C. Zumbrun

Twenty-two years after the Supreme Court’s ruling in Bestfoods, a government contractor—PPG Industries, Inc. (“PPG”)—comes face to face with one of the most important tenets of that court’s decision: operator liability under Superfund. Although the Supreme Court’s decision in Bestfoods focused on operator liability in the context of a parent and subsidiary relationship, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals in PPG Industries, Inc. v. United States of America et al. relied on the Supreme Court’s analysis of operator liability in determining whether the United States should be held liable under CERCLA as an operator in connection with chromium production during World War II. This case serves as a reminder to private industry: you do not have to be physically operating a plant or facility in order to be liable as an “operator” under Superfund. Rather, you can acquire liability by managing, directing, or conducting activities specifically related to operations involving releases or disposal of hazardous substances, or by engaging in decisions regarding compliance with environmental regulations.

As the Third Circuit explained, chromium production was regulated by the government during both world wars given that chromium chemicals were designated as critical war materials for military use. Chromium distribution was controlled pursuant to orders issued during World War II by the Chemicals Bureau of the War Production Board (“Board”), although chromium production—including the processing of ore and management of waste—were not part of the government’s orders. PPG purchased a facility from a former chromium chemical manufacturer (Natural Products Refining Corporation or “NPRC”) in 1954, and continued to process chromium chemicals until 1963. PPG filed a private cost-recovery claim against the government seeking the recovery of CERCLA response costs that it expended ($367 million, to date), as well as contribution for past and future costs.

PPG’s main contention was that Bestfoods did not apply to its case since that ruling did not involve the government as an operator, and that if Bestfoods was applicable, operator liability should be imposed on those parties having “direction” or “general control” over a facility’s activities. The Third Circuit rejected these arguments and, applying Bestfoods’ definition of “operator” to the wartime operations conducted at the PPG facility, observed that although the government controlled certain aspects of chromium distribution, including pricing and quantities of chromite ore that NPRC could buy and to whom NPRC could sell, as well as what orders had priority, the government did not specifically control operations related to pollution. The Third Circuit considered evidence related to the stockpiling of waste outdoors (which caused the contamination) and rejected the proposition that the government was “directing” PPG to produce more wastes merely because of the government’s knowledge that ramping up chromium production would lead to an increased amount of chromium wastes to be managed. The court also noted that no court has said that the test for determining operator liability depends upon whether a potentially responsible party is a private party or a governmental entity, and cited its 1994 decision in FMC Corp. v. United States Department of Commerce (in which the court found the government liable as an operator based on its active involvement and substantial control of the facility). Further, the court noted that the FMC decision (which PPG argued was a similar case) was distinguishable because the government was directly involved with waste production and regulation at the plant.

The court’s decision and analysis in PPG offers some interesting insights to the concept of operator liability under Superfund and, further, provides instructive guidance to private industry on how to avoid CERCLA liability as an operator. Perhaps the most critical “takeaway” from this case is that operator liability depends on the relationship between the potentially responsible party and the waste-producing facility. “Actual control” of a facility is not necessary; the relevant inquiry will be whether an alleged operator exercises control over “operations having to do with the leakage or disposal of hazardous waste, or decisions about compliance with environmental regulations.” Under this analysis, the relationship between the potentially responsible party and the facility—and not the relationship between the potentially responsible party and the owner of the facility—is the focus of the inquiry. The Third Circuit has just reinforced the Supreme Court’s analysis of CERCLA operator liability as first explained in Bestfoods two decades earlier.

The Supremes Weigh in on Superfund and the Clean Water Act

Margaret Anne Hill, Frank L. Tamulonis III, and Stephen C. Zumbrun

Notwithstanding that the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (more commonly known as “Superfund”) has been around for 40 years, and the fact that numerous cases have made their way to the U.S. Supreme Court analyzing liability under the Act, debates continue as to who can be a Superfund “potentially responsible party” or a “PRP.” For those who still do not get the scope and reach of Superfund liability, the Supreme Court has, once again, provided a clear response with respect to liability under the Act in an April 20, 2020, decision, Atlantic Richfield Co. v. Christian et al. In that case, the Court reaffirmed its position set forth in a 2007 case, United States v. Atlantic Research Corp., 551 U. S. 128, 136 (2007), that even parties whose property has been contaminated by others, and who are innocent with respect to the contamination, fall within the broad definition of liable parties under Section 107(a) of Superfund (which uses the term “covered persons”), subject to the third-party defense set forth in Section 107 (b).

Atlantic Richfield involved a group of 98 property owners who filed claims against Atlantic Richfield in Montana state court in connection with the Anaconda Copper Smelter Superfund Site in Butte, Montana, a 300-square-mile site contaminated with arsenic and lead. The property owners’ claims included trespass, nuisance, and strict liability claims under state common law. The landowners sought restoration damages, among other forms of relief, which was the issue before the Court since Atlantic Richfield conceded that Superfund preserves claims for other types of compensatory damages under state law, including loss of use and enjoyment of property, diminution of value, incidental and consequential damages, and annoyance and discomfort. The property owners sought to implement a remedial restoration plan that exceeded the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency’s (“EPA”) selected remedial actions. The question regarding their PRP status was before the Court in the context of determining if they were prohibited from taking further remedial action without EPA’s approval under Section 122(e)(6). Continue reading “The Supremes Weigh in on Superfund and the Clean Water Act”

EPA Takes a Case-by-Case Approach in New Guidance for Cleanups and Emergency Response Actions: A First in Its History

Margaret Anne Hill, Frank L. Tamulonis III, and Stephen C. Zumbrun

On April 10, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) released its latest coronavirus COVID-19 Guidance addressing cleanups and emergency response actions that are being conducted under various environmental laws, including Superfund, RCRA Corrective Actions, TSCA PCB cleanup actions, and the Oil Pollution Act, as well as the underground storage tank program. The bottom line for businesses and the regulated community: for response actions where EPA is the lead agency or has direct oversight for work being performed, EPA is directing its Regional Offices to evaluate, and periodically reevaluate, whether ongoing response actions should continue in light of the potential impact of COVID-19 on cleanup sites, the surrounding communities, EPA personnel, and the respective states. EPA advises that decisions about continuing, reducing, or pausing cleanup actions should be made on a case-by-case basis, and that any requests from potentially responsible parties for extensions or delays in performance should also be evaluated individually.

EPA’s general directive to its regions is that they should consider whether to move forward with response actions, or whether, under the circumstances, securing a site is more appropriate so that response actions can continue at a later date. While on-site response actions may start or continue where there are no COVID-19 health declarations that prohibit or discourage such activities, EPA emphasizes that other factors must also be considered, including: the safety and availability of work crews, the critical nature of the work, logistical challenges (e.g., transportation, lodging, availability of meals, etc.), and the nature of the construction required. Continue reading “EPA Takes a Case-by-Case Approach in New Guidance for Cleanups and Emergency Response Actions: A First in Its History”

FERC Provides Additional Regulatory Relief and Guidance in Response to Coronavirus Pandemic

Mark R. Haskell, Brett A. Snyder, and Lamiya N. Rahman

On April 2, 2020, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (“FERC” or “Commission”) announced several measures intended to provide relief to regulated entities responding to the COVID-19 pandemic. A summary of FERC’s previous COVID-19-related relief and guidance can be found here.

In a Policy Statement, the Commission indicated it will prioritize and expeditiously act on requests for relief filed by regulated entities in connection with ensuring business continuity of their energy infrastructure. In a series of notices and orders, the Commission also extended or clarified the relief available to regulated entities that are unable to meet certain deadlines or regulatory requirements as a result of their COVID-19 response. This relief includes:

    • Extension to June 1, 2020 for the following deadlines:
      1. Form Nos. 60 (Annual Report of Centralized Service Companies) and 61 (Narrative Description of Service Company Functions);
      2. Form No. 552 (Annual Report of Natural Gas Transactions); and
      3. Electric Quarterly Report Form 920.
    • Extensions to May 1, 2020 for the following deadlines for categories of filings that would otherwise be due on or before May 1, 2020:
      1. interventions, protests, or comments to a complaint;
      2. briefs on and opposing exceptions to an initial decision;
      3. answers to complaints and orders to show cause; and
      4. initial and reply briefs in paper hearings.
    • Waiver of FERC regulations governing the form of filings submitted to the Commission (e.g., provision of sworn declarations) through May 1, 2020.
    • Shortening of the answer period to three business days for motions for extensions of time due to COVID-19 emergency conditions. The Commission indicated it will also consider requests to shorten the comment period for motions seeking waiver of requirements in Commission orders, regulations, tariffs, rate schedules, and service agreements to as short as five days.
    • Temporary blanket waivers from document notarization and in-person meeting requirements established under open access transmission tariffs, or other tariffs, rate schedules, service agreements, or contracts subject to the Commission’s jurisdiction. These waivers are effective through September 1, 2020.
    • Extension of time for filing regional transmission organization (“RTO”)/independent system operator (“ISO”) Uplift Reports and Operator Initiated Commitment Reports required pursuant to Order No. 844 that were originally due between April and September 2020. These reports are now due to be posted on the RTOs/ISOs websites by October 20, 2020.

Please click here for the full client alert.

EPA Announces New Policy Regarding Enforcement Discretion

Margaret Anne Hill, Frank L. Tamulonis III, and Stephen C. Zumbrun

OVERVIEW/APPLICABILITY/SCOPE

Due to the coronavirus COVID-19 pandemic, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) announced a Policy that will effectively relax civil enforcement in certain circumstances. The EPA recognizes that worker shortages and supply issues may exist due to the pandemic and has decided to exercise enforcement discretion with respect to compliance with environmental laws. The Policy is retroactive to March 13, 2020, and while EPA emphasizes that it is temporary, EPA did not provide a termination date. It is important to note that the Policy applies only to certain civil violations and the regulated community is required to make every effort to maintain compliance with environmental laws. We have outlined below important specifics that will guide you in relying upon the Policy. You should contact counsel if you are having compliance issues due to the COVID-19 situation or have questions regarding EPA’s new Policy. Continue reading “EPA Announces New Policy Regarding Enforcement Discretion”

FERC Issues Guidance and Regulatory Relief in Connection with Coronavirus Response

Mark R. Haskell, Brett A. Snyder, Lamiya N. Rahman, and Jane Thomas

On March 19, 2020, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (“FERC” or “Commission”) announced several regulatory responses to the coronavirus pandemic and FERC Chairman Neil Chatterjee held a press conference to discuss the agency’s initiatives. The Chairman emphasized the capabilities of the Commission and its staff to work in a timely manner throughout the pandemic response, while striving to provide necessary flexibility to regulated entities.

The Chairman named Caroline Wozniak, a Senior Policy Advisor in the Office of Energy Market Regulation, as the point of contact for all energy industry inquiries related to the impacts of COVID-19. Members of the regulated community may e-mail PandemicLiaison@FERC.gov with questions for Commission staff.

Chairman Chatterjee clarified that the Commission will provide regulated entities with flexibility when needed, but emphasized the Commission is fully functioning and will try not to delay decisions. Chairman Chatterjee also stated his goal is to issue certain rehearing orders involving pipeline certificate projects challenged by affected landowners within 30 days, consistent with guidance from the Chairman issued on January 31, 2020.

Please click here for the full client alert.

DOJ Axes Supplemental Environmental Projects in Civil Settlements

Kevin R. Doherty and Margaret Anne Hill

Earlier this month, the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) officially eliminated the use of “Supplemental Environmental Projects” in civil settlements. The once-popular settlement tool, commonly known as SEPs, allowed alleged violators of environmental laws to complete Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”)-approved projects in exchange for reduced penalties. These projects were considered by EPA and DOJ as providing tangible environmental and/or public health benefits to the environment and/or the affected community, and through their completion, settling parties were permitted to offset a portion of their civil penalties through cost effective and proactive environmental measures. Continue reading “DOJ Axes Supplemental Environmental Projects in Civil Settlements”

FERC Issues Penalty Assessment in Vitol CAISO Market Manipulation Proceeding

Mark R. Haskell, George D. Billinson, and Lamiya N. Rahman

The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission issued an Order Assessing Civil Penalties, imposing approximately $1.5 million in civil penalties on Vitol Inc. and one million dollars in penalties on a Vitol trader. In a departure from prior cases, the Commission assessed penalties well below Enforcement Staff’s recommended six-million-dollar penalty for the company, in light of the individual trader’s significant involvement in the alleged scheme. The next step for Respondents wishing to challenge the Order will be de novo review in federal district court.

On October 25, 2019, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (“FERC” or “Commission”) issued an Order Assessing Civil Penalties (“Order”), imposing civil penalties of $1,515,738 against Vitol Inc. (“Vitol”) and one million dollars against Federico Corteggiano, a Vitol trader, in connection with an alleged market manipulation scheme in the California Independent System Operator Corporation’s (“CAISO”) markets.[i] Additionally, the Commission ordered Vitol to disgorge unjust profits, plus interest, of $1,227,143.

As we have previously discussed, the Commission began this proceeding by issuing an Order to Show Cause and Notice of Proposed Penalty to Respondents on July 10, 2019. In that order, the Commission directed Vitol and Corteggiano to show cause why they should not be assessed civil penalties of six million dollars and $800,000, respectively, and why Vitol should not be required to disgorge unjust profits of $1,227,143, plus interest. Respondents elected to have the Commission assess an immediate penalty if it finds a violation and then proceed with de novo review before a federal district court.

In the instant Order, the Commission found that Vitol and Corteggiano (collectively, “Respondents”) violated the anti-manipulation prohibitions in the Federal Power Act (“FPA”) and FERC’s Anti-Manipulation Rule[ii] through a cross-market scheme in which Respondents sold power at a loss in the CAISO wholesale electric market to avoid greater losses in Vitol’s positions in a separate financial product—congestion revenue rights (“CRRs”).[iii]

Please click here for the full client alert. 

[i] Vitol Inc., Order Assessing Civil Penalties, 169 FERC ¶ 61,070 (2019).

[ii] FPA § 222 (2012); 18 C.F.R. § 1c.2 (2019).

[iii] Specifically, the Commission found Respondents intentionally engaged in fraudulent physical energy imports during the period October 28-November 1, 2013, at the Cascade intertie to relieve congestion at Cragview, which in turn lowered the Cragview locational marginal price (“LMP”) and economically benefitted Vitol’s CRRs sourced at that location. Order at P 34.

FERC Issues Show Cause Order Proposing $6.8M in Civil Penalties to Vitol Inc. and Individual Trader and $1.2M Disgorgement for Alleged CAISO Market Manipulation

Mark R. Haskell, George D. Billinson, and Lamiya N. Rahman

Recently, FERC issued an Order to Show Cause why Vitol Inc. and its co-director of financial transmission rights trading should not be found to have engaged in market manipulation by selling physical power in CAISO at a loss to eliminate expected losses on Vitol’s Congestion Revenue Rights. Within 30 days of the date of the Order, Respondents must show cause why they should not be found to have committed market manipulation, pay civil penalties, and disgorgement, as well as make an election under FPA § 31(d)(1) whether to proceed before an Administrative Law Judge or opt to have FERC assess a penalty and then proceed with de novo review by a federal district court.

On July 10, 2019, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (“FERC” or “Commission”) issued an Order to Show Cause and Notice of Proposed Penalty[1] to Vitol Inc. (“Vitol”) and Vitol’s co-head of financial transmission rights (“FTR”) trading, Federico Corteggiano (“Corteggiano”), (together, “Respondents”), directing the Respondents to show cause why they should not be found to have violated the anti-manipulation provisions of the Federal Power Act (“FPA”)[2] and the Commission’s regulations.[3]

The Order arises from allegations by FERC’s Office of Enforcement (“Enforcement”) that Respondents engaged in a “cross-product market manipulation scheme” by selling physical power at a loss in the California Independent System Operator (“CAISO”) day-ahead market to avoid even greater losses on their positions in a separate financial product—congestion revenue rights (“CRRs”). Enforcement’s factual allegations and legal analysis, resulting from an investigation into Respondents’ trading, are detailed in the Enforcement Staff Report and Recommendation included with the Order.[4] The investigation was prompted by a report from a CAISO market participant regarding Vitol’s activity.

Please click here for the full client alert. 

Leveling the Playing Field against Federal Agency Regulatory Interpretation: The Supreme Court’s Kisor Decision and the U.S. Attorney General’s 2018 Memorandum

Margaret Anne Hill, Brett A. Snyder, Frank L. Tamulonis III, and Stephen C. Zumbrun

Last month, the Supreme Court in Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S.Ct. 2400 (2019) upheld what is known in administrative law as Auer deference: the age-old principle that a court should defer to an agency when the agency is interpreting its own ambiguous language in a regulation. See Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452 (1997); see also Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410 (1945). Deference to an agency’s regulatory interpretation has long been a challenge to industry and the broader regulated community. In any situation where an agency is on the other side of an issue—whether negotiations or a lawsuit—the agencies always had the upper hand when regulatory language was ambiguous. And this interpretation could often be the deciding factor between a party being in compliance with or in violation of a regulation.

But, with the Kisor decision the Court attempted to respect decades of precedent in this area yet rein in the frequency of Auer deference’s use and assuage naysayers by establishing clear standards for when a court should defer to an agency’s interpretation of its own regulations. Continue reading “Leveling the Playing Field against Federal Agency Regulatory Interpretation: The Supreme Court’s Kisor Decision and the U.S. Attorney General’s 2018 Memorandum”

%d bloggers like this: